Picking the Turf with China

The Real Reason for Military Build Up in the Americas

Introduction

Over the past two years, the United States has rapidly expanded its military footprint across Latin America and the Caribbean. Officials continue to frame these deployments as part of a renewed effort to counter narcotics trafficking, dismantle violent transnational criminal organizations, and restore stability to regions affected by cartel violence. While this explanation is not false, it obscures a deeper and more strategically significant objective. The real driver behind the build up is the need to counter the growing influence of China, as well as the activities of Russia and Iranian proxies, throughout the Western Hemisphere. In this context, the fight against narcotics is an important but secondary benefit. The primary goal is to reassert control over a region that U.S. adversaries have used as a permissive environment for expanding their geopolitical reach.

Recent reporting reinforces this perspective. As indicated by the recent reactivation of Roosevelt Roads Naval Station, the United States is not just surging forces into the region. It is reestablishing permanent basing and infrastructure in Puerto Rico, which is the clearest indicator that Washington views the Caribbean as a long term strategic theater rather than a short term counter narcotics mission.

This article examines how recent military activity, intelligence investments, and diplomatic messaging reveal a far larger strategic contest. It argues that the United States is deliberately shifting the center of gravity in its rivalry with China from the Western Pacific to its own hemisphere. By doing so, Washington aims to deny its adversaries a foothold in the Americas while forcing Beijing and its partners to compete on terrain that favors the United States.

Narco Terrorism as a Convenient Public Narrative

There is no doubt that narcotics trafficking continues to destabilize large parts of the region. The corrosive effects of cartels, corruption, and transnational criminal organizations remain a genuine concern for U.S. policymakers. This makes the anti cartel narrative an attractive public rationale. Politically, it is easier to justify troop deployments, intelligence expansion, and maritime interdiction when the stated objective is to protect American communities from fentanyl and cocaine.

During this period, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps surged forces into the Caribbean. Carrier strike groups, amphibious ready groups, destroyers, maritime patrol aircraft, Marine aviation assets, and Air Force bombers all operated under U.S. Southern Command’s authorities and were described as supporting counter narcotics missions. The reopening of naval facilities in Puerto Rico, the forward positioning of F-35B aircraft, the use of MQ-9 Reaper drones for persistent surveillance, and the dramatic increase in maritime presence were all publicly framed within the drug control mission set.

However, the scale, sophistication, and persistence of this force posture exceed what is typically required for narcotics interdiction. What is being assembled closely resembles a theater wide security umbrella that enhances situational awareness not only of criminal networks but of state actors. It is the sort of posture a country builds when it expects to monitor adversarial military, political, and economic behavior across an entire region. And the real tipper is not the ships or the aircraft, which are inherently transitory, but the permanent basing and infrastructure the United States is once again establishing. That is where the long term intent becomes unmistakable.

Beijing’s Campaign for Influence in the Americas

The clearest explanation for the U.S. build up lies in China’s increasingly assertive presence across Latin America. Over the last decade, Beijing has invested tens of billions of dollars in infrastructure, telecommunications, energy, mining, and political influence operations. These efforts accelerated following the pandemic and now include several developments that directly challenge U.S. interests.

One of the most visible fronts is Venezuela. China has become one of the primary lifelines of the Maduro regime through loans, oil backed financing, and investments that give Beijing strategic leverage over the country’s economic infrastructure. Reports indicate that China has helped establish satellite ground stations and surveillance facilities in Venezuela. These projects strengthen Maduro’s internal stability while providing China with intelligence access to the hemisphere.

Relations between Caracas and Beijing deepened further in 2023 when the two governments announced an all weather strategic partnership. Following Venezuela’s deeply disputed 2024 election, China was among the first nations to congratulate Nicolás Maduro and express support for his continued rule. Rather than remaining on the sidelines, Beijing has aligned itself politically with a government that has become a hub for anti U.S. activity.

China’s economic penetration extends beyond Venezuela. Guyana has become a major target following large offshore oil discoveries. Chinese companies hold significant stakes in the Stabroek oil block and have acquired major gold mining assets in the country. These investments give China influence over an emerging petrostate at a moment when Guyana’s strategic relevance is rapidly increasing. Chinese firms have also pursued telecommunications and infrastructure projects across Central America and the Caribbean, including in countries such as El Salvador and Panama. Concerns have grown regarding Chinese involvement near the Panama Canal and the potential for dual use facilities that could provide Beijing with leverage over maritime logistics.

Together, these actions suggest a deliberate strategy to expand Chinese influence in regions historically within the U.S. security perimeter. And as one senior defense official recently noted, it is becoming more difficult to justify why the United States does not simply say this openly, rather than continue couching the response under the banner of narcotics interdiction.

Russia and Iran in the Regional Shadow

Although China is the most significant actor, Russia and Iran have also used the Western Hemisphere to push back against U.S. interests. Russia maintains defense cooperation with Venezuela and Nicaragua and has reportedly explored expanding its presence in Cuba. These activities include arms sales, intelligence cooperation, and military advisory support. While Russia lacks the economic power of China, it continues to seek ways to exploit anti U.S. regimes as staging grounds for influence and intelligence collection.

Iran’s activities take a different form. Through proxy networks such as Hezbollah, Tehran maintains a presence that spans the tri border region of South America and parts of Venezuela. These networks are involved in fund raising, logistics, smuggling, and influence operations. More recently, Iran has delivered military drones to Venezuela and strengthened ties with governments in Nicaragua and Bolivia. The expanding cooperation between Tehran and several Latin American regimes underscores the region’s growing importance to adversaries seeking alternative avenues to challenge U.S. power.

The convergence of Chinese money, Russian military cooperation, and Iranian proxy activity has transformed parts of Latin America into a zone of strategic vulnerability for the United States. This reality is central to understanding why Washington is strengthening its own regional posture.

The U.S. Response: Military Presence, Intelligence Saturation, and Strategic Signaling

The military build up across the Caribbean and Latin America should be seen as a multidimensional effort to regain the initiative. The deployments are only one part of a broader strategy that includes intelligence expansion, diplomatic engagement, and security partnerships.

The presence of F-35 aircraft, Reaper drones, littoral combat elements, maritime patrol aircraft, and surveillance platforms creates an unprecedented intelligence collection network over the hemisphere. This network improves monitoring of narcotics flows but also provides continuous tracking of state affiliated activities, foreign military movements, infrastructure developments, and potential malign influence operations.

Diplomatically, senior U.S. defense and intelligence officials have made repeated visits to Colombia, Guyana, Brazil, and Panama. Many of these trips resulted in new security agreements, expanded access, and deeper intelligence partnerships. In parallel, the administration has begun emphasizing the importance of the Western Hemisphere in official speeches, describing the region as a top priority and expressing concern about foreign interference.

Taken together, these actions suggest a long term plan to deny adversaries freedom of action in the Americas while reassuring partners that the United States is committed to regional stability. Yet they also raise a more candid question: how long can the United States stretch existing forces across Europe, the Pacific, and now the Caribbean without increasing end strength. Expanding hemispheric commitments without increasing capacity risks vulnerability elsewhere.

Bringing the Rivalry to Ground of U.S. Choosing

At the strategic level, this approach represents a shift in how the United States intends to compete with China. For years, Washington engaged Beijing primarily in Asia, where China possesses geographic and logistical advantages. By choosing to contest influence within Latin America, the United States is creating a competing center of gravity. Operating within its own hemisphere allows the U.S. military to leverage proximity, established infrastructure, and longstanding partnerships. It forces China to expend energy protecting its regional investments and managing political backlash among Latin American governments wary of great power competition.

In effect, Washington is signaling that the rivalry will no longer play out exclusively in the South China Sea or the first island chain. Great power competition is migrating into the Western Hemisphere, and the United States intends to shape the environment before China can consolidate positions of influence. The question many strategists now ask is why Washington does not simply say this outright, rather than continuing to frame it as an outgrowth of the war on narcotics.

Conclusion

The renewed U.S. military build up across Latin America reflects more than a counter narcotics mission. It represents the opening stages of a hemispheric strategy designed to counter Chinese expansion, constrain Russian and Iranian activities, and restore a security environment more favorable to U.S. interests. While the narrative of combating cartels serves an important purpose, the deeper strategic logic is clear. Washington is choosing the terrain on which the next phase of great power rivalry will be fought. It is selecting ground where it maintains the advantage, where its adversaries are least prepared, and where the consequences of inaction would be most severe.

The Western Hemisphere is no longer a secondary theater. It has become a central front in the geopolitical contest of the twenty first century, and the reactivation of bases like Roosevelt Roads proves the United States is preparing to stay.

References

Atlantic Council. (2024). China and Venezuela’s strategic alignment.
Associated Press. (2025). U.S. military posture in Puerto Rico and the Caribbean.
Fox News. (2024). China’s expanding influence in Venezuela and beyond.
Newsweek. (2024). U.S. deployments and narcotics interdiction missions.
Reuters. (2024). Guyana’s rising oil sector and foreign investment dynamics.
Southern Command. (2025). Posture statements and regional threat assessments.
The Diplomat. (2024). China’s role in Guyana’s energy and mining sectors.
U.S. Department of Defense. (2025). Secretary of Defense remarks on Western Hemisphere security.